THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TERRORISM PREVENTION POLICY: THE CHALLENGES OF COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM IN EAST JAVA

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Abstract

This study examines the implementation of terrorism prevention policy through a counter-radicalization program carried out by the Coordination Forum for the Prevention of Terrorism of East Java (FKPT East Java). The theoretical framework used is the theory of implementation of public policy with street-level bureaucracy *approach fronted by Michael Lipsky to see how lower-level bureaucracy such as FKPT East Java implement policies on preventing terrorism in regional case studies, and Community Engagement Program (CEP) to see how FKPT East Java build networks and collaborate with various stakeholders in East Java to implement policies agreed upon at the National Meetings (National Working Meeting/Rakernas). The research method used is qualitative. The data collection techniques were done through in-depth interviews with several FKPT East Java board members. As well as observations of the implementation of counter-radicalization programs in East Java. Discourse Analysis is used as a data analysis technique to see whether the discourse in the regulations conforms with the interpretation of each of the FKPT East Java board members that have been interviewed. This research will produce an assessment to see whether the interpretation of the interview result conforms with the implementation in the field. The findings of this study indicate that in implementing terrorism prevention policies, FKPT East Java still depends on BNPT despite the efforts to involve FKPT East Java in policy formulation, however, FKPT East Java has considerable discretion in determining cooperation networks in implementing terrorism prevention policies when directly involved on the ground.*

Keywords: Terrorism Prevention Policy, Counter-Radicalization Program, FKPT East Java

Abstrak

Penelitian ini mengkaji tentang implementasi kebijakan pencegahan terorisme melalui program kontra-radikalisasi yang dilaksanakan oleh Forum Koordinasi Pencegahan Terorisme Jawa Timur (FKPT Jatim). Kerangka teoritik yang digunakan adalah teori implementasi dari kebijakan publik dengan pendekatan street-level bureaucracy yang digawangi oleh Michael Lipsky untuk melihat bagaimana birokrasi tingkat bawah semacam FKPT Jatim mengimplementasikan kebijakan pencegahan terorisme di daerah dan *community engagement programme* (CEP) guna melihat bagaimana FKPT Jatim berjejaring dan bekerjasama dengan berbagai *stakeholder* di provinsi Jawa Timur untuk melaksanakan kebijakan yang sudah disepakati dalam Rapat Kerja Nasional (Rakernas). Adapun metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah kualitatif dengan teknik pengumpulan data melalui wawancara mendalam dengan beberapa pengurus FKPT Jatim dan observasi pelaksanaan program kontra-radikalisasi di Jawa Timur dengan teknik analisis data menggunakan *discourse analysis* guna melihat kesesuaian wacana yang ada dalam peraturan dengan interpretasi dari tiap pengurus FKPT Jatim yang telah diwawancarai. Penelitian ini nantinya akan menghasilkan penilaian tentang kesesuaian antara interpretasi hasil wawancara dengan implementasi di lapangan. Hasil temuan data yang diperoleh melalui penelitian ini memperlihatkan bahwa FKPT Jatim dalam mengimplementasikan kebijakan pencegahan terorisme masih bergantung kepada keputusan dari BNPT meskipun ada usaha untuk melibatkan FKPT Jatim dalam formulasi kebijakan, namun di lapangan, FKPT

Jatim memiliki diskresi yang cukup besar dalam menentukan jaringan kerjasama dalam mengimplementasikan kebijakan pencegahan terorisme.

Kata kunci: Kebijakan Pencegahan Terorisme, Program Kontra-radikalisasi, FKPT Jawa Timur

I. INTRODUCTION

The acts of terrorism in Surabaya on May 13-14, 2018, raised questions about security policy, especially in the counter-terrorism sector. Acts of terrorism in Indonesia with the modus operandi of suicide bombings began with the Bali 1 bombing in 2002 whose perpetrators came from Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) formed by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, followed by various other explosions such as the Bali 2 bombing, the Mega Kuningan bombing, the Australian Embassy bombing, to new groups such as Jamaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD) who masterminded the Sarinah attack, Jakarta; Kampung Melayu bombing; Mako Brimob attack and the Surabaya bombing. In response to acts of terrorism in 2002, the Indonesian government, under Megawati Soekarnoputri, issued Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of the Criminal Acts of Terrorism, which was passed into Law Number 15 of 2003 on the Eradication of the Criminal Acts of Terrorism. This law was then revised into Law No. 5/2018 on the Eradication of the Criminal Acts of Terrorism in response to the Surabaya bombings, which included the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT).

Most of the research about Indonesian terrorists or extremist, such as the one conducted by John T. Sidel usually focused on the terrorist group rather than how the government tried to prevent the terrorist threat (Sidel, 2006).

BNPT was previously formed under the name of the Terrorism Eradication Coordination Desk (DKPT) and changed its name to BNPT with the enactment of Presidential Regulation Number 46 of 2010 concerning the Counterterrorism Agency which was revised into Presidential Regulation Number 12 of 2012 concerning Amendments to Presidential Regulation Number 46 of 2010 concerning the Counterterrorism Agency.

The BNPT established the Terrorism Prevention Coordination Forum (FKPT) at the provincial level with a legal basis in the form of Regulation of the Chief of the National Counterterrorism Agency Number: PER-03/K.BNPT/1/2017 concerning General Guidelines for the Coordination Forum for the Prevention of Terrorism in the Region which serves as a guideline for the implementation of terrorism prevention policies through counter-radicalization programs. Indonesia itself often faces acts of terrorism that require laws and regulations as previously stated, while acts of terrorism in Indonesia according to BNPT have been recorded in the following table:

Table 1. Terrorism in Indonesia

No	Date	Events
1	March 28, 1981	Garuda Indonesia Flight 206 It was hijacked by 5 terrorists disguised as passengers. They were armed with machine guns and grenades and claimed to be members of the Jihad Command.
2	January 21, 1985	Borobudur Temple Bombing This is the second jihad-motivated terrorist incident to hit Indonesia.

3	August 1, 2000	Philippine Embassy Bombing
4	August 27, 2000	Malaysian Embassy Bombing
5	September 13, 2000	Jakarta Stock Exchange Bombing
6	December 24, 2000	Christmas Eve Bombing
7	July 22, 2001	Santa Anna and HKBP Church Bombings
8	September 23, 2001	Plazza Atrium Senen Jakarta Bombing
9	October 12, 2001	KFC Restaurant Bombing, Makassar
10	November 6, 2001	Australian School Bombing, Jakarta
11	January 1, 2002	New Year Bombing
12	October 12, 2002	Bali Bombing
13	December 5, 2002	McDonald's Restaurant Bombing, Makassar
14	February 3, 2003	Bombing of Police Headquarters Complex, Jakarta
15	April 27, 2003	Soekarno-Hatta Airport Bombing, Jakarta
16	August 5, 2003	JW Marriot Bombing
17	January 10, 2004	Palopo Bombing
18	September 9, 2004	Australian Embassy Bombing
19	December 12, 2004	Bomb blast at Immanuel Church, Palu
20	March 21, 2005	Two bombs explode in Ambon
21	May 28, 2005	Tom Tentena
22	June 8, 2005	Pamulang Bombing, Tangerang
23	October 1, 2005	Bali Bombing
24	December 31, 2005	Palu Market Bombing
25	July 17, 2009	Two powerful explosions at the JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton Hotels, Jakarta. The explosions occurred almost simultaneously.
26	January 2010	Civilian shooting in Aceh
27	September 2010	CIMB Niaga bank robbery
28	April 15, 2011	Cirebon Bombing
29	April 22, 2011	Serpong Gading Bombing
30	September 25, 2011	Solo Bombing
31	August 19, 2012	A grenade exploded at Pospam Gladak, Solo, Central Java. The explosion caused damage to chair at Pospam Gladak.
32	June 9, 2013	Poso Police Bombing Targeted police personnel who were on morning roll call.
33	January 14, 2016	Jakarta bombings and shootings Explosions and gunfire around Sarinah Plaza, Jalan MH Thamrin, Central Jakarta.

Source: BNPT infographics on Twitter

In implementing counter-terrorism policies, BNPT uses two approaches (strategies): hard approach in the form of eradicating terrorism by arresting terrorists, conducting operations to prevent acts of terrorism (carried out in coordination with Special Detachment 88/Densus 88) and soft approach, where this approach has two sub-strategies: deradicalization to deal with groups that have been exposed to radical-terrorism thinking and counter-radicalization to prevent the spread of radical-terrorism understanding in society.

The first FKPT was formed in West Nusa Tenggara on April 5, 2012 and the FKPT in East Java is the fourteenth FKPT formed on March 21, 2013 with Dr. Soubar Isman as its chairman. The FKPT itself was formed as a task force to implement counter-radicalization programs in the regions with the aim of preventing the spread of radical-terrorist thinking in five fields: Religion, Education, and Da'wah; Economy, Socio-Culture and Law; Mass Media, Public Relations, and Socialization; Youth and Women; and Assessment and Research, involving four elements: government, representatives of community organizations, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and academics. FKPT has a duty to coordinate cooperation with local governments, both provincial, district or city and also with *stakeholders* in the region such as non-governmental organizations, community organizations, student organizations, and other groups that have a role in preventing terrorism with local wisdom. Therefore, FKPT East Java is tasked and functions to

prevent the spread of radical terrorism thoughts through counter-radicalization programs in East Java. As a regional task force, in implementing terrorism prevention policies, FKPT East Java has a strategic partner, namely BNPT, where program implementation is often carried out together with BNPT. The source of funding for the main program of each field in FKPT East Java comes from BNPT as the main authority in countering terrorism.

Because of its scope at the provincial level, the East Java FKPT board is drawn from East Java residents. This scope makes FKPT East Java a *street-level bureaucrat*, the lowest level of bureaucracy that dealt with the public, in the field of terrorism prevention that has the authority related to terrorism issues. At the policy implementation stage, FKPT East Java interprets the terrorism prevention policy

The main task of BNPT is listed in Article 7 of Perkap BNPT Number 3 to implement terrorism prevention policies in the regions. One of the ways is by disseminating propaganda that is counter to radical ideology, inviting the community to be proactive in preventing terrorism in the regions, and carrying out deradicalization in the regions whose entire policy is based on local wisdom. However, in implementing terrorism prevention policies, the National Counterterrorism Agency seems too centralized in implementing its policies and in its organization (Hwang, 2018: 150). In terrorism prevention policy, FKPT East Java does have discretion in its implementation, but in determining what will be implemented is still through coordination with the center.

The purpose of this research is to know and illustrate in depth the implementation of terrorism prevention policy in East Java using street-level

stated in Perkap BNPT Number 3 as a general guideline. The counter-radicalization program itself is a derivative of the terrorism prevention policy with educational activities and activities to increase awareness among the people of East Java against radical terrorism thinking.

As state administration research, this research will focus on the implementation of terrorism prevention policy through the counter-radicalization program by FKPT East Java. FKPT itself is not formed in second-level regions such as regencies and cities unless needed. FKPT East Java has various activities such as involving Campus Da'wah Institutions (LDK) in the prevention of terrorism, and counselling religious leaders to village officials carried out in various regencies and cities in East Java.

bureaucracy theory and community engagement program. Problems and weaknesses in the implementation of terrorism prevention policy will be explained in depth so that criticism and suggestions can be made to related parties in order to improve the *outcome of* terrorism prevention policy in East Java.

This research is expected to add to the treasure of literature in the field of terrorism prevention, especially in the aspect of the role and function of institutions at the city level that have produced various programs and policies. In turn, it will also provide '*lessons learned*' from the presence of a terrorism prevention institution, especially from the dimension of its roles and functions that have an impact on the integrated prevention of terrorism and radicalism that is cross-institutional.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Street-Level Bureaucracy

Policy implementation is the most important stage in public policy, this is because implementation determines whether a policy can be considered successful or not. Public policy is a milestone in which the policy will have an impact or not on the community with the aim of changing the livelihood of the population. The success of the government is also determined by the impact obtained by the people who receive the policy implementation.

Street-level bureaucrats can be interpreted literally as lower-level bureaucracy, where the public bureaucracy is often in contact with the community. This theory was first expressed by Michael Lipsky who examined how lower-level bureaucracies such as the police worked in the field and made the lower-level bureaucracy determine the success of policy implementation. This study looks at aspects of lower-level bureaucratic interactions with clients such as the place of interaction, the frequency of interaction, the circumstances of the interaction, and the resources in the interaction (Lipsky, 2010: 61). In addition, street-level bureaucracy also explains how aspects of control over clients are carried out by lower-level bureaucracies such as: The lower-level bureaucracy interacts with clients with rules that symbolize, reinforce, and limit the relationship between the two; clients are isolated from each other; services and procedures in the lower-level bureaucracy are provided as friendly as possible; clients must come to the lower-level bureaucracy's office in order to get their public services; interactions with clients are organized so that the lower-level bureaucracy can regulate the content, timing, and speed of services; interactions between residents and the lower-level bureaucracy are dominated by controlled routines and the lower-level bureaucracy develops sanctions to punish attitudes that do not respect routines.

Furthermore, Lipsky (Lipsky, 2010) said that rules and regulations are only guidelines for determining eligibility in the distribution of rewards and punishments, this is because discretion is often used to determine the appropriateness of receiving rewards and punishments.

In addition to Lipsky, there is Hupe and Hill (2007: 279) that stated there are three important questions about street-level bureaucracy, those are: what forms do relationships in which street-level bureaucrats are held accountable, what is the nature of street-level bureaucracy, and what are the implications of the conception of governance. Furthermore, they stated that the two crucial characteristics of street-level bureaucracy are the relatively high level of discretion and the relative autonomy of organizational authority (Hupe and Hill, 2007). Lower-level bureaucracies also try to find ways to manage their own work and see themselves as professionals (Hupe and Hill, 2007). Professional expertise is needed to achieve policy objectives. Lower-level workers have specific knowledge of local conditions, making their judgment valuable (Assadi and Lundin, 2018: 154).

Fineman's study (1998: 953–69) using street-level bureaucracy on the work of environmental supervision inspectors has concluded the importance of routine activities that are close to rituals, where the personal style, skills, and emotions of bureaucrats at the lower level are like meat wrapped tightly around the bones of regulation. In other words, regulation is not merely a matter of the existence of legal

rules, but substantial implementation is also influenced by the style, skills, and emotions of the inspectorate which affect social or organizational construction. Fineman's study expands Lipsky's depiction of the role of street-level bureaucrats in policymaking.

Durose (Durose, 2007) emphasizes three main points of Lipsky's depiction of the role, all of which are interconnected. The three have relatively high discretion to carry out activities, are relatively autonomous from organizational authority, and have limited personnel and organizational resources. Because of this high level of discretion, it allows implementers to modify activities. After examining the British government's public sector reform agenda in the field of labor, Durose concluded that the presence of street-level bureaucrats who are also referred to as 'front-line workers' has the opportunity to use skills and strategies for complex activities.

In their interactions with various individuals with various roles, the lower-level bureaucracy is a public official (Hupe and Hill, 2007). There are different kinds of lower-level bureaucracies: agency, functionary, and task. Lower-level bureaucracies carry out their tasks within micro-networks or networks that are both vertical and horizontal (Hupe and Hill, 2007). As the months and years of their working life increase, lower-level workers will interact with a number of clients and colleagues and will be exposed to a variety of responses and outcomes. Exposed to various situations, they will develop an understanding of what their job is and how to do it. Ultimately, lower-level bureaucrats will be able to perform their tasks and act independently (Assadi and Lundin, 2018).

Community Engagement Program (CEP)

Efforts should be made to build awareness among both government and community leaders to invest in community engagement projects. Community leaders should help to build trust and loyalty within the community to the government to spread peace, harmony, and security. The current view is that cooperation with the government should move forward to promote moderation, tolerance, and coexistence (Gunaratna, 2013). A government working with a community will do everything it can to detect attacks at the planning and preparation stages.

According to Low Ai Ling (Ling, 2013), the key to CEP is to develop a real and practical ability to mobilize and intervene in a situation through a cadre of trained and prepared activists who will respond to a crisis *in situ*. CEP will seek to expand stakeholder groups to cultivate and develop communal harmony and emergency preparedness (Ling, 2013).

As for Hussain Qadri (2013: 31) reviews CEP in terms of how the use of terms such as *war on terror* and *crusade of the 21st Century* actually strengthens extremists. Understanding the nature of the threat by terrorist and extremist groups is the first step to weakening these forces. In addition, CEP also reviews *fear management*, where fearful responses and a lingering state of mind can make the government, media, and public vulnerable to overreactions that can be detrimental to political and social unity and risk creating turmoil rather than eradicating terrorism (Veldhuis and Bakker, 2013).

II.   METHODS

This research uses a qualitative approach to examine the truth and authenticity of phenomena that are the

result of socio-cultural construction and are an interactive process (Neuman, 2014). The type of research used is descriptive research to paint a picture using words or numbers and to present a profile, type classification, or outline steps to answer questions such as who, when, where, and how, while descriptive research will produce a detailed description of the problem or answers to research questions (Neuman, 2014).

The research was conducted in East Java. In qualitative research, researchers choose participants or locations that will help to understand research questions, as for the informants chosen are:

a. Dr. Soubar Isman as the Chairman of FKPT East Java;
b. Najib Hamid, M.Si as Secretary of FKPT East Java;
c. Syarwani, SH as Head of the Economic, Socio-Cultural and Legal Division of FKPT East Java;
d. Wahyu Kuncoro, M.Med.Kom as Head of Mass Media, Public Relations and Socialization, FKPT East Java;
e. Dr. Hesti Armiwulan as Head of the Youth and Women's Division, FKPT East Java;
f. Dr. Nurul Barizah, LLM as Head of the Assessment and Research Division, FKPT East Java.

Data collection in qualitative research is carried out by researchers through in-depth interviews and observations. Observation is carried out in a natural setting to get an overview of certain conditions in several places that have been held by the East Java FKPT Program. As for data analysis techniques, researchers refer to Miles and Huberman who divide data analysis in qualitative research into three stages: data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification (Miles et al., 2014: 31–33).

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Objective of FKPT

The positioning of East Java is due to the existence of a terrorism network in Lamongan and also the high potential for radicalism. According to the members of FKPT, when interviewed by researchers, East Java is a red-coded area, which indicates that there is still a lot of radicalizations occurring in the province bordering Bali. The other two codes are Green and Yellow, where Green indicates a safe area for radicalism and extremism, and yellow shows the spread of radical and extreme thinking that is on the rise in the region. Since the police cannot immediately act against people with radical or extreme views unless they have committed an act of terrorism, the FKPT will act to prevent the spread of radical thinking among the general public. The table shows the list of FKPTs formed from 2012 to March 2013.

Table 2. List of FKPTs Established from 2012 to March 2013

No.	Province	Date of Inauguration
1.	West Nusa Tenggara	April 5, 2012
2.	Riau Islands	May 2, 2012
3.	Lampung	May 25, 2012
4.	West Java	June 13, 2012
5.	Aceh	August 7, 2012
6.	South Sumatra	September 19, 2012
7.	Maluku	September 27, 2012
8.	Central Java	October 12, 2012
9.	Bali	October 19, 2012
10.	North Sumatra	November 29, 2012
11.	West Kalimantan	December 5, 2012
12.	Jakarta	February 6, 2013
13.	South Sulawesi	March 5, 2013
14.	East Java	March 21, 2013

Processed from various sources.

The formation, according to Head of the Mass Media, began with BNPT "write a letter" to the East Java Provincial

Government to create an FKPT in East Java, so then the Governor gathered all community leaders to choose people who would sit in the East Java FKPT chair, at the beginning of its formation there was still no validity period (service period).[1]

Although BNPT already has its own laws and regulations enacted in Law Number 5 of 2018 on the Eradication of Acts of Terrorism, which previously BNPT was regulated through Presidential Regulation Number 46 of 2010 on the National Counterterrorism Agency, the FKPT under BNPT still follows the Regulation of the Chief of the National Counterterrorism Agency Number Per-03/K.BNPT/1/2017 concerning General Guidelines for the Terrorism Prevention Coordination Forum. Perkap BNPT is the legal basis for the existence of FKPT as well as general guidelines for FKPT in carrying out its main tasks and functions.

With the existence of Perkap BNPT Number 3 as the legal statute for the implementation of the FKPT's main tasks and functions, this statute is also in the form of the Articles of Association and Bylaws (AD/ART) of organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah, the Islamic Student Association, and so on, so that it also includes a vision in article 2: *FKPT's vision is the growth of public awareness in the regions about the threat and danger of terrorism based on local wisdom values in order to realize a peaceful Indonesian society.*

This is followed by the mission in article 3, which contains four paragraphs:

1. Increasing community resilience in the face of the threat of the spread of radical ideology of terrorism.

2. Raising public awareness against the threat of terrorism in the region in a sustainable, measurable, and locally appropriate manner.

3. Increasing community awareness and early vigilance in the regions through the cultivation and practice of the four basic national consensuses consisting of Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, NKRI, and Unity in Diversity;

4. Developing local cultural wisdom in pluralistic regions to counter the threat of radicalism and terrorism.

These four missions are an elaboration of the vision that will later become operational guidelines for implementing counter-radicalization programs in the form of workshops, seminars, or workshops tailored to the invited participants. This is in line with what Michael Howlett et al. (2009) states that statutory law is usually addressed to certain administrative agencies or ministries to empower any administrative rules or regulations needed to ensure the successful implementation of the principles and objectives of these rules.

Managing the FKPT

The East Java FKPT management consists of various elements of society with different backgrounds. Soubar Isman as the chairman of FKPT East Java is taken from the State Civil Apparatus (ASN), namely the Police, two representatives from the professional community namely Imung Mulyanto from Arek TV and Wahyu Kuncoro from Harian Bhirawa, both of which are professional elements from the mass media, two people from academia

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[1] Interview with WK, Head of Mass Media of FKPT East Java, September 10, 2019, 09.18 WIB

namely Nurul Barizah from Airlangga University and Hesti Armiwulan from the University of Surabaya, from the elements of community organizations are Najib Hamid from Muhammadiyah and Shubhan from Nahdlatul Ulama, and finally, Ahmad Syarwani who is a member of the NII Crisis Center founded by Ken Setiawan. He was included in the East Java FKPT because of his experience as a "recruitment" officer for NII in the East Java region.

Based on the explanation of the six speakers, all of them stated that the source of funding and determination of counter-radicalization programs comes from the center (BNPT), where FKPT only implements programs that have been determined. So that in the formation of policies, the relationship between BNPT and FKPT is Top-Down, where policies have been assembled and designed by BNPT at the Center, while FKPT is only a kind of committee or event organizer in the regions if BNPT holds a program in the area. This is in line with the views of Victor Bekkers et al. (Bekkers et al., 2017) regarding success in policy implementation are: the organization forms a unit with a clear authority structure, contains a clear hierarchical structure and an appropriate division of tasks, obligations, and authority.

The laws and regulations related to terrorism prevention policies implemented by FKPT East Java, the discourse developed are two things: local wisdom to prevent the spread of radical thoughts that lead to terrorism and tolerance as an instrument to maintain unity and integrity. To implement discourse of tolerance, FKPT East Java collaborates with the Interfaith Harmony Forum (FKUB). The discourse of local wisdom is contained in BNPT Perkap No. 3 Article 7 number 2: *The implementation of policies, strategies, plans, and programs to prevent terrorism as referred to in paragraph 1 letter a is adjusted to the local wisdom of the local community.*

Although some programs have indeed been established through the FKPT National Coordination Meeting held by BNPT, in the implementation in the field, FKPT (including those in East Java) also have the right to make modifications (which do not eliminate the essence) of the program. This is in accordance with the existence of policy discretion in policy implementation that adjusts policy implementation to the needs in the region. In accordance with the view of Michael Lipsky (Lipsky, 2010) that street-level bureaucrats make policies in two ways, one of which is the existence of discretion to citizens or residents with whom they always interact.

Because it is involved in the prevention of terrorism or counter-radicalization, the programs carried out are mostly in the form of workshops and seminars to provide understanding to organizational delegates and invited guests about the dangers of radical understanding of terrorism. Counter-radicalization itself targets people who are exposed to radicalism but have not yet reached radical-terrorist views, so the output of counter-radicalization programs is twofold: first, to make people who are exposed to radical terrorism abandon this understanding, and second, to prevent the development of radical-terrorist understanding to prevent the growth of new cells of terrorist groups.

The study of street level bureaucracy was developed by Michael Lipsky in 1980 in his book *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*. The discussion of this theory also revolves around the problem of public policy implementation in the field

which is full of policy discretion. Public policy always comes out in the form of laws and regulations so that bureaucrats need to interpret the policy so that it can be implemented in the field in accordance with the policy document. In this case, FKPT East Java needs to make interpretations and discretion in the field but not get out of the corridor that has been determined in BNPT Perkap Number 3. Each field, according to the Head of Mass Media, will get two programs that must be implemented: one program that comes from the center (BNPT) and another one can be in the form of cooperation with stakeholders in the region (such as the regional government, DPRD (Regional Legislative Council), NGOs or mass organizations) within a two-year period of service.

In implementing a policy, each implementor must have their own interpretation of the policy. As stated by Charles O. Jones (1996: 296) where one of the pillars of public policy is interpretation which means interpreting so that the program becomes an appropriate plan and direction that can be accepted and implemented. From Jones' explanation, it can be understood that FKPT East Java board members need to interpret the counter-radicalization program first. The following table shows the East Java FKPT board's interpretation of the term counter-radicalization.

Table 3. Interpretation of East Java FKPT Management on Counter-radicalization

No	Name	Counter Radicalization Interpretation
1.	Dr. Soubar Isman	Against radicalization, these activities are against radicalization.
2.	H. Najib Hamid, M.Si	Take actions that can prevent the growth of movements that the government calls radical.
3.	Syarwani, S.H.	To stem radicalism. Radicalism is fine, but when it leads to terrorism, it needs to be prevented, it is called counter-radicalization.
4.	Wahyu Kuncoro, M.Med.Kom	Counter means against - that which confronts from the outside. Counter-radicalization is for the public. Something that is opposite to the teachings conveyed by the radicalism (pen: group) earlier.
5.	Dr. Hesti Armiwulan	Counterradicalism means fighting back. It cannot be fought frontally, so using a *soft approach* makes community participation possible. Community participation is needed so that people are aware of radical thoughts that lead to terrorism.
6.	Nurul Barizah, Ph.D	Counter-radicalization, in essence, makes people not become radicalized. How then we [FKPT East Java] are able to provide socialization to the community so that the seeds of radicalism are decreasing in society.

A common thread can be drawn from the understanding of each East Java FKPT board that counter radicalization is a program to fight, stem, and prevent radicalism that leads to terrorism in East Java society (in accordance with the jurisdiction of East Java FKPT). From this interpretation of the term counter-radicalization, this terrorism prevention agency comes up with programs that are prepared in the National Coordination Meeting (Rakornas) which is the stage of policy formulation, while this understanding is also useful for members of BNPT's arm in East Java to implement terrorism prevention policy programs through counter-radicalization programs.

Regarding FKPT partners, the Chairman of the East Java FKPT said that the five fields in the East Java FKPT have their respective cooperation. The partners are determined by each field according to their needs, for example, the Women and Children's Division, collaborates with the

Women's Empowerment Office in implementing their programs, as well as community organizations that work in the field of women such as Muslimat NU and Aisyiyah.

The existence of these partners makes FKPT East Java worthy of being seen from the perspective of the community engagement program because its members will actively continue to be in contact with the community, while partners can invite FKPT East Java to cooperate by making one of its administrators a presenter in discussions, seminars, workshops, or workshops.

When interviewed by researchers at the Harris Hotel, the chairman explained that each field has its own targets. She cited the example of the Women and Children's Division implementing a program called *Women Agents of Peace* in Bukit Daun, Kediri, where the participants were the heads of women's organizations.[2] Reported by Berita Jatim (Masyhari, 2019) that the event featured Arteria Dahlan from Commission III of the House of Representatives with an estimated 100 participants. The event aimed to improve women's ability to carry out early detection systems related to radicalism and terrorism. One of the cases that contributed to the reason why it is important for women to be involved in terrorism prevention policies is the action of a mother in Sibolga who blew herself up with her child as well as the Surabaya bombing which involved a mother and her children.

Through the explanations of the sources of this research, there are rumors that can be inscribed related to the determination of FKPT East Java program participants:

$$M - K = P$$

M is Community, K is Quota, and P is Representative. The target of the programs implemented by the East Java FKPT is the community but there is a quota that makes the implementation of the program unable to invite all people in East Java, so those invited by the East Java FKPT to become program participants are representatives of the East Java community such as media practitioners (journalists, editors, editors); community leaders (from the fields of education, arts, or religion) or social media activists who according to the Head of Mass Media, can spread the messages of the program he participates in. The above formulation uses subtraction (-) rather than division (:) because the determination of participants comes from the policy discretion owned by FKPT East Java, if using division, then participants must represent people from all regions of East Java, which in its implementation is not the case. The quota is determined by BNPT but is freed up to FKPT East Java to choose who to invite, such as Wahyu Kuncoro who invited researchers as a representative of the blogger element, because according to him, the distribution of participants is determined by FKPT East Java, not BNPT.

In implementation, a series of instruments are needed for the successful implementation of FKPT East Java programs that have been determined by BNPT. In the science of public policy, it is called a policy instrument. According to the Chairman of FKPT East Java, what needs to

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[2] Interview with SI, Chairman of FKPT East Java, June 20, 2019, 09.00 WIB.

be prepared by FKPT East Java before implementing the program is the target.[3] Determining this target is the prerogative of FKPT from each region, but the quota is determined by BNPT. After knowing the target, FKPT will coordinate the program to be implemented with related agencies or institutions.

If the goal of terrorism prevention policies and counter-radicalization programs is to spread counter-narratives as well as counterpropaganda against radical-terrorism thinking, then participants who come from the mass media and cover the implementation of counter-radicalization programs are policy instruments to disseminate peaceful messages to the public through their mass media. This is part of the soft approach promoted by BNPT under Suhardi Alius, therefore, BNPT and FKPT programs are very much found in *online* news portals.

Indeed, in the implementation of terrorism prevention policies through counter-radicalization programs, human resources, and budgets occupy the top position in the hierarchical policy instruments. This is because the majority of programs have been facilitated by the central government, including the budget, but for human resources, FKPT East Java is free to choose, both for program participants and the program committee. Program participants will also be one of the policy instruments because these participants are expected to spread the messages conveyed by the speakers in the policy of preventing terrorism through counter-radicalization programs implemented by FKPT East Java.

Challenges in Implementing Counter-radicalization Programs

For the chairman, the obstacles faced by FKPT East Java are related to the targets targeted, such as targeting students, sometimes some can send participants and some cannot, as well as other obstacles related to the budget. The absence of participants is also due to information that is less widespread or from the invited participant agency is having another event.[4] The Secretary also conveyed the same problem, namely the budget determined by the center (BNPT), both the budget and the program did not reach all East Java. He said that the program is equalized between provinces with small areas and those with large areas such as East Java, so the program is not sufficient to cover all cities/districts in East Java.[5] Both the chairman and secretary underlined the budget constraints on the implementation of counter-radicalization programs in East Java.

However, Head of the Economic, Socio-Cultural and Legal Division expressed something different from the two speakers above, that there were no obstacles to implementation originating from FKPT East Java, but obstacles in the community that were increasingly indifferent to the problems of the movement, especially participants who had participated in the program and then did not convey to the environment where they lived. Regarding obstacles, the source who was quite direct in discussing it was the Head of Mass Media, who said that the program in the region did not match the regional reality

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[3] Interview with SI, Chairman of FKPT East Java, June 20, 2019, 09.00 WIB.

[4] Interview with SI, Chairman of FKPT East Java, June 20, 2019, 09.00 WIB.

[5] Interview with NH, Secretary of FKPT East Java, May 27, 2019, 14.30 WIB.

because the design was from the center (BNPT), while the problems faced by each region were different, but FKPT East Java had to implement it because FKPT was the BNPT's task force. Regarding the budget, it was also an obstacle conveyed by the Head of the Youth and Women's Division when interviewed. She considers that the budget from BNPT to FKPT East Java is very strict because it comes from the state budget. In the end, the main problem of FKPT East Java, according to Hesti, is more or less the same as what Julie Chernov Hwang said, that BNPT is too centralized, so FKPT East Java does not have the flexibility to choose participants, locations, and other things related to the implementation of the event.[6] Head of the Assessment and Research Division is quite critical and skeptical in seeing the tasks carried out by the East Java FKPT, Head of the Assessment and Research Division considers that there is no maximum result because it only conducts lectures and how far the reach of these lectures is. FKPT does not work on a capacity basis but only works when there are instructions from BNPT.[7]

Almost all speakers, except Head of the Economic, Socio-Cultural and Legal Division, emphasized that the problem of implementing counter-radicalization programs in the field is the budget (APBN) which is only obtained from BNPT, while cooperation with other parties is more about program cooperation. Head of the Assessment and Research Division emphasized the ability of FKPT East Java to counter radicalization as an obstacle, while Hesti emphasized how the centralization of

policies complicates implementation in the regions.

Overview of Implementing Counter-radicalization Programs

One of the most frequently implemented programs targets students but can be implemented by different fields, depending on the themes raised after the results of the National Coordination Meeting. During the 2017-2019 period, the Religion, Education, and Da'wah Division had the most programs with the involvement of religious instructors, religious teachers, and mosque takmir to fight radicalism, while the least was the Research and Assessment Division because the number of research areas is quite large, requiring a long time.

Fifteen of the twenty counter-radicalization programs implemented in 2017/2019 were structured as seminars, workshops, and workshops. These educative practices are implemented with the hope that participants will later spread the narratives and propaganda they get in the program. Because the program is educational according to The Secretary, it is necessary to have participants.[8] This is in line with Clarke Jones' view (C. Jones, 2019) that community engagement programs will succeed by involving partnerships and coalitions that help mobilize resources and influence systems, change relationships between partners, and become catalysts for changes in policies, programs, and practices and Rohan Gunaratna (Gunaratna, 2013) that efforts should be made to build awareness among

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[6] Interview with HA, Head of the Youth and Women's Division of FKPT East Java, June 24, 2019, 13:25 WIB.

[7] Interview with NB, Head of the Assessment and Research Division of FKPT East Java, May 31, 2019, 11:30 WIB.

[8] Interview with NH, Secretary of FKPT East Java, May 27, 2019, 14.30 WIB.

government and community leaders of the importance of investing in community engagement projects against extremism and to make the public aware it is necessary to educate them through various platforms.

The most important thing about community engagement programs such as those implemented by FKPT East Java is the involvement of the community in each agenda. Hence, the community becomes the main policy target through the medium of representatives from organizations or community leaders with the hope that representatives can spread what they get when participating in the FKPT East Java program.

Implementation studies as a study that discusses one part of the public policy sub-system also focus on actors rather than policy implementation or so-called implementers. Apart from implementers, another term that is also used to describe policy implementers in the field who are often in contact with the community is *Street-Level Bureaucracy* coined by Michael Lipsky.

Starting with the discussion of policy formulation, where BNPT has the authority to determine the programs to be implemented by FKPT in the regions, BNPT is considered top-down in both organization and style (Hwang, 2018). According to the Head of Mass Media, the National Coordination Meeting is related to the evaluation of management and the National Coordination Meeting is to make a work program, BNPT already has an outline, and FKPT comes to discuss together what programs will be implemented.[9] When looking from the perspective of Street-Level Bureaucracy,

this is in line with what was conveyed by Maupin (Maupin, 1993) that solving the Top-Down or Bottom-Up dilemma must include the lower-level bureaucracy in program development, objectives, design, and implementation strategies. For Assadi and Lundin (Assadi and Lundin, 2018). It is important to include street-level bureaucrats because they have specific knowledge of local conditions, making their judgment extremely valuable. However, there are still problems where programs approved at Rakernas sometimes do not match local realities.

In the implementation of counter-radicalization programs, program participants are expected to continue the messages that have been conveyed through related programs, this issue relates to what Lipsky said (Lipsky, 2010) that clients of street-level bureaucrats *are* expected to be grateful for the benefits they have received. Lipsky also suggests that clients must come to street-level bureaucrats in order to get services. Although this view is not customer-oriented, the implementation of counter-radicalization programs in East Java follows this view through the location of the events. Through the researcher's observations, counseling, seminars, workshops, and workshops were indeed held in several districts/cities in East Java, but the location of the event meant that participants (clients) had to come to the event to receive services from FKPT East Java in the form of increased awareness in dealing with radical terrorism understanding and ways to prevent it, and by getting transportation money.

As a lower-level bureaucracy working in the field of terrorism prevention,

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[9] Interview with WK, Head of Mass Media of FKPT East Java, June 23, 2019, 16.00 WIB.

FKPT East Java has resources in the form of human resources, namely administrators and Peace Ambassadors. These Ambassadors of Peace are FKPT East Java cadres to spread messages that counter the narrative of radical-Terrorism groups and assist in the implementation of counter-radicalization programs. The allocation of these resources is fully held by the East Java FKPT as a BNPT task force, although the determination of policies is often held by the BNPT.

Lower-level bureaucracy such as FKPT has discretion so it should be included in the process of policy formation and policy evaluation. Each FKPT in the region has its own ways and obstacles in implementing terrorism prevention policies, therefore, FKPT should be one of the centers in security policy studies and counterterrorism in Indonesia.

IV. CONCLUSION

The policy of preventing terrorism through counter-radicalization program in East Java is implemented by the East Java Counterterrorism Coordination Forum (FKPT Jatim) in collaboration with two parties: stakeholders in East Java and the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT). Cooperation with BNPT is mandatory because the main funding comes from the central agency for countering terrorism, BNPT is a resource that is authorized to provide administrative funds related to the implementation of counter-radicalization programs, as well as provide technical advice and assistance to the government at the lower level (FKPT East Java). With the cooperation between FKPT East Java, BNPT, and stakeholders in East Java, FKPT East Java also builds a network between the center and the regions in the case of terrorism prevention. Network building for policy implementation will use the perspective of street-level bureaucracy and community engagement programs.

Street-Level Bureaucracy

In order to implement terrorism prevention policies, a special organ is needed under the National Counterterrorism Agency as a government agency tasked with solving terrorism problems. Therefore, a Coordination Forum for the Prevention of Terrorism was established at the provincial level, which will coordinate stakeholders in the province to implement terrorism prevention policies. FKPT will function as a facilitator and host in implementing a counter-radicalization program, which is an interpretation of terrorism prevention policy.

FKPT's function makes it a street-level bureaucracy. Because of its role as a lower-level bureaucracy, it needs a board that contains individuals who can touch the grassroots, in this case, figures who have a wide network and not only come from the government but also from elements of society.

The policy discretion exercised by FKPT East Java is not merely a matter of local speakers and venues, but also of cooperation. FKPT East Java has invited other stakeholders in the implementation of terrorism prevention policies such as the Attorney General's Office, Surabaya State University, Jember University, Airlangga University, Islamic Student Association, Muhammadiyah, and Nahdlatul Ulama as evidenced by the existence of other activities than those scheduled with BNPT. However, this collaboration is only in the nature of providing presenters and providing education regarding the understanding of radical terrorism in cooperating institutions. As for the freedom

in this collaboration, many of them are networks of the East Java FKPT management. FKPT East Java eventually formed its program as community engagement which will be explained in the next sub-chapter.

Community Engagement Program (CEP)

If Street-Level Bureaucracy is used to see the organization as well as individuals within FKPT East Java in interacting with and implementing counter-radicalization programs, then the Community Engagement Program is a frame to see the counter-radicalization program itself.

As an organization that implements educational programs targeting communities in East Java with only eight administrators, it is necessary to have a program that can bind communities in East Java in spreading counter-narratives against radical-terrorist thinking. Therefore, as mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, FKPT East Java invites the cooperation of various stakeholders in the region, especially the Regional Government, both at the Provincial (East Java) and Regency/City levels. This cooperation is carried out by providing material to stakeholder representatives with the hope that the messages in this program will later be conveyed to the community.

According to the researchers, there are three types of FKPT East Java partners, the first is a strategic partner, namely BNPT, where FKPT East Java runs programs resulting from the national meeting; active partners who are organizations/groups/communities that invite FKPT East Java to provide enlightenment, lectures, counseling related to the dangers of radical understanding of terrorism and in this case share tasks in the implementation of the event (example:

Constitutional Law Study Circle, Faculty of Law, University of Surabaya and Islamic Student Association), and passive partners who participate in FKPT East Java programs as program participants.

Although the majority of cooperation is still led by FKPT East Java, CEP needs to start with groups that are aware *of* radicalism, extremism, and terrorism so that in the future, the community will be more active in counteracting these three understandings by itself. Problems in the field, FKPT East Java has considerable discretion to determine with whom to cooperate. FKPT East Java itself is an element of the government that coordinates the implementation of terrorism prevention policies through counter-radicalization programs at the lowest level with regional stakeholders *in* accordance with the concept of countering violent extremism. One of the discussions which is not deliberately included in this research is the part of intelligence in counter-radicalization program which can be used for future research.

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